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Caruthers argues that the mindreading capacity and the introspective capacity are 
in fact one and the same capacity. This single capacity relies on the same sub-personal 
"interpretive" mechanism that takes sensory information as input and produces attitudes 
as output. I use neuroscience research to show that if the “interpretive mechanism” exists, 
and moreover that it operates in accordance to Caruthers’ description in mindreading 
tasks, (e.g. detecting external cues and paying attention to others’ behavior), then this 
operation would have to be handled or implemented at the neural level by the Task 
Oriented Neural Network. On the other hand, it is well known that self-referential 
thought, including introspective thought is handled by the Default Mode Network. This 
consequence is problematic for the view that self and other attitude attributions are done 
by the same mechanism. The same cognitive operation can not be implemented by two 
distinct neural networks that are in competition with one another. Moreover, the Default 
 vii 
Mode neural network and the Task Oriented networks implement such different types of 
thinking that they oppose and interrupt one another’s functioning. If the only difference 
between the two networks were that one simply handles a larger quantity of information 
than the other, then they wouldn’t be in competition. It appears that there is indeed 
something special about the very nature of self-referential information such that it 
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Caruthers argues that the mindreading capacity (attributing judgments to others 
e.g. "she does not think pasta is a good meal") and the introspective capacity (attributing 
judgments to self e.g. "I do not think pasta is a good meal") are in fact one and the same 
capacity (Caruthers, 2010). This single capacity relies on the same sub-personal 
"interpretive" mechanism that takes sensory information as input and produces attitudes 
as output. According to Caruthers, the only difference between the self attributions and 
the other attributions is quantitative and not qualitative in kind. That is, there is simply 
more sensory evidence available for self attributions than for other attributions. 
Importantly the type of access to one’s attitudes and others’ attitudes is the same. 
Intuitions of authority and phenomenological immediacy (when it comes to self 
attributions) are explained away as simply due to practice and plethora of sensory 
information. Confabulation experiments have shown infallibility of self attributions to be 
empirically lacking. That is, while we think we know our own judgments, experiments 
show that we often confabulate and make stuff up. Moreover, Caruthers argues that there 
is nothing unique about phenomenological immediacy since we often make attributions 
to others' judgments with similar quickness and ease. 
This paper is aimed at challenging the above claims. Namely I will contest the 
following subparts of the above idea.  
(1) The attitudes of the self and of the other are always interpreted using the same kind of 
mechanism. 
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(2) Evolution favors the existence of a single “other-directed” mindreading mechanism 
(with indirect introspective ability being a mere by-product of such pressures) 
This paper will contain two chapters. In chapter one, I will lay out Caruthers’ 
view as presented in his paper “Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated” and 
elaborated on in his book The Opacity of Mind. In chapter two, I will present an objection 
to his view.  
A preliminary consideration is in order. While Caruthers’ main target is the idea 
that we have direct introspective access to our judgments and attitudes, I will remain 
neutral on this claim throughout this paper. I will mainly concern myself with taking 
apart the argument he makes against direct introspective access. These challenges will be 
grounded in Caruthers’ favored playing field: empirical evidence. Specifically I will 
illustrate how current neuroscience research cannot accommodate any version of a 
“self/other parity” account. Philosophers who defend this (neurological) account argue 
that the process by which we come to know our own attitudes is the same type of process 
by which we come to know the attitudes of others. I will show that it can not be the same 
process since two distinct neural networks handle each process respectively. Moreover, 
these two networks are in competition with one another.  
The upshot of using this neuroscience research is the following. If the 
“interpretive mechanism” exists, and moreover that it operates in accordance to 
Caruthers’ description in mind reading tasks, (e.g. detecting external cues and paying 
attention to others’ behavior), then this operation would have to be handled or 
implemented at the neural level by the Task Oriented Neural Network. On the other hand, 
it is well known that self-referential thought, including introspective thought is handled 
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by the Default Mode Network. This consequence is problematic for the view that self and 
other attitude attributions are done by the same mechanism. The same cognitive operation 
can not be implemented by two distinct neural networks that are in competition with one 
another.  
Furthermore, I will offer an alternative evolutionary story from that of Caruthers’. 
He conjectures that an organism’ fitness would be better served if he were to rely on a 
single “do it all” interpretive mechanism for self and other attributions. Why waste the 
extra energy developing two mechanisms when one serves both functions? I will explain 
how an organism’s fitness would be increased if there really were two distinct cognitive 
mechanisms for engaging in self-referential and non-self-referential thought.   
 In sum, these considerations will show that Caruthers’ thesis that same sub-
personal "interpretive" mechanism is responsible for self and other attributions is really 
not the best explanation for all the relevant empirical findings.   
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Chapter 1. Challenge to Introspection: ISA Theory 
 
1.1 WHAT IS “INTROSPECTION”? 
 In his paper Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated, Caruthers argues that 
there is no such thing as introspective access to one’s judgments (*Caruthers defines 
judgments as events of belief-formation, and decision as events of intention formation), 
attitudes, and decisions.  
The type of access in question is a way of learning about your own (fairly current) 
mental states that is not available to others. Specifically, Caruthers defines introspection 
such that introspective judgments do not (only) appeal to the subject’s behavior or 
circumstances as inputs (p.77). In other words, if introspective access were available to 
you, you could exercise it in the following way. If someone were to ask you if you agree 
that, “Russian gymnasts are the best in the world,” all you would have to do is “focus 
inwards” and you would, via introspection, see whether you in fact hold this attitude.  In 
order to make this view somehow more plausible at first blush, it is necessary to note that 
Caruthers does indeed grant introspective access perceptual experiences, imagery and 
inner speech. Going back to our example, if you are sitting and the following image 
springs to mind “Russian gymnasts all adorned in gold medals with a gold-like halo 
shinning around their heads”, this image will serve as a pretty vital piece of input to your 
belief formation. 
 In order to see what species of views Caruthers is challenging with his thesis, it 
would be useful to go over several vital features typically attributed to introspective 
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access in the literature. Introspective access is always described with two characteristic 
features: not available to others (i.e. special or peculiar), and authoritative. 
 The type of knowledge that results from real introspective access is supposed to 
be particularly secure. That is, you are the authority on whether you hold this attitude or 
not. It would be ludicrous for someone to come up to you and inform you, to your 
surprise, that you in fact do not hold this attitude. All someone could do in protest is point 
to some of your external behavior he came to observe. For example, he could say “I don’t 
think you really judge that Russian gymnasts are the best in the world, since you were 
booing them during the Olympics”. This observation of your behavior is of course not a 
foolproof or “reliable” indicator of your true attitudes. In reply you could say “Yes, I was 
making booing sounds but that’s because I wanted to appear as if I don’t hold that they 
are the best in the world”. There is nothing really that your friend could say in response. 
In other words, you have the final say on what is going on “inside your head”. So while 
other people can observe your behavior and theorize about its relation to your attitudes, 
all you have to do is “introspect” and your attitudes will become inwardly apparent to 
you. Moreover, while you can be mistaken about lots of things i.e. the answer to your 
logic homework, your true national origins, the size of your pen, or even the color of your 
room; you cannot be mistaken about what attitudes you hold or what judgments you 
make. That is your reasoning could be off in performing modus tollens, your parents 
could have been lying to you and you are in fact adopted, the stripes on your pen could be 
making it look wider than it actually is, you could be experiencing some strange 
hallucination and your walls could appear purple to you. However, if you focus inwards, 
you will be able indubitably tell what your attitudes are. Since there is no room for error, 
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the introspective access is generally held to be “direct” (It is notable that authority can 
come in milder varieties).  
 In summary, it would be useful to go over a few conditions that mark a truly 
introspective process. The “mentality condition” is simply the condition that delineates 
the targets of an introspective process. According to this condition, in order for a process 
to count as introspective, it provides access to your own mental events, and not to events 
that are going on outside your window. The “first-person condition” states that in order to 
count as introspective, a process must be generating knowledge only about your own 
mental states. Simply staring intensely at yourself in the mirror in an attempt to determine 
your mental goings on does not amount to introspection per se, since you can just as 
easily stare at other people. Again, you have to somehow “focus inwards” at your own 
mental goings on in order to count as introspecting them. According to this condition, 
you can not introspect the mental states of others. The “temporal proximity condition” 
dictates that introspection could only be attempted as a way of getting on your fairly 
current mental goings on. If you try to get onto what you thought about the Russian 
gymnastics team back in the Soviet era, you would no longer be introspecting, but merely 
remembering your mental states. The next condition is particularly mysterious and yet 
has been taken to be obvious by philosophers and folk psychologists alike. The 
“directness condition” states that you get onto your mental states “directly”. That is, you 
don’t have to pull out your pocket dictionary and consult your latest Facebook status 
updates in order to know what your judgments currently are. You simply “look within” 
and see. Notably, most philosophers do not hold that no “computations” are made when 
an attitude is introspected. Some grant that the mind has an architecture that is complex 
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and perhaps performs some sub-personal computations before a full fledged thought is 
formed (Lycan, 1987, 1996). What is important is that these computations aren’t 
inferences that take the subject’s own behavior and circumstances as premises.    
Another rather mysterious condition is called the “detection condition”. This condition 
implies that when you introspect, you get onto something that is already formed. In this 
way, introspection is similar to fishing (with a motion detector). Your inner attitudes and 
judgments are fish in the pond and when you catch a fish you bring your attitudes to light. 
That is, while you might not have been paying attention to some of your attitudes while 
watching TV, when you focus within and “detect” the attitude, you inevitable become 
aware of it. This notion is further elaborated upon in the “effort condition”, which states 
that an introspective process is one that requires some effort. To continue with the fishing 
analogy, fish don’t just come up to you; you have to throw a line into the water and catch 
it. In other words, you have to “focus within” and you will get onto your attitudes. These 
attitudes are already there, so to speak, waiting to be detected. In your effort to introspect, 
you don’t just proceed to make attitudes up as you go, they are already formed.  
This paper will center around Caruthers’ attack on the “first person” condition. 
This condition is upheld by the Transparency Theory of Self-Knowledge. The 
transparency theory aims to do the following. Firstly, it offers a concrete and clear 
proposal of a non-extravagant mechanism for acquiring self-knowledge. Secondly, it 
purports to vindicate authoritative and special access. Byrne offers a particularly clear 
exposition of this approach. He defends a transparency method, or epistemic rule:   
              BEL: if p, then believe that you believe that p. 
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According for Byrne, following the epistemic rule requires recognizing that its antecedent 
obtains, and then doing what its consequent prescribes because of such recognition. 
This method is supposed to secure the subject authoritative access described above. 
According to Byrne, if you merely try to follow the rule, the prescribed belief will be 
true. Trying to follow BEL or any other epistemic rule involves believing that its 
antecedent obtains (p is true), but being wrong about this (the antecedent does not obtain; 
p is not true), and thus failing to know or to recognize that the antecedent obtains (failing 
to know p). 
  The upshot is that the subject believes-but-doesn’t-know p, which of course 
suffices to make true the item of self-knowledge that the rule instructs the subject to 
have: believe that you believe p. Since the method suffices to make the output item of 
self-knowledge true, i.e. provides a kind of reliable basis for true belief, the output item 
qualifies as knowledge. 
 Moreover, according to Byrne, the transparency method secures special access. 
 Byrne suggests the rule could in principle be applied to other people but would not 
retain. This method is non-extravagant. If we can reason, that is, if we can follow 
epistemic rules, then we can follow this one to acquire self-knowledge. 
Caruthers’ account of introspection is a type of “self/other parity” account. That is 
he denies 1
st
 person access, as well as authoritative and special access. Contra Byrne, he 
argues that the process by which we come to know our own attitudes is the same type of 
process by which we come to know the attitudes of others.  
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1.2  CARUTHERS’ MODEL OF INTROSPECTION 
 Caruthers defends an “Interpretive Sensory Access” theory of self knowledge 
(Opacity of Mind, preface, xii). This theory goes against the 1
st
 person condition and 
states that our mode of access to our own thinking is the same as our mode of access to 
the thinking of other people (ibid). According to Caruthers, judgments are current evens 
of belief-formation and decisions are “events that create novel activated intentions” (ibid) 
 
Here are the relevant predictions made by the ISA theory: 
(a) There is a single mental faculty underlying our attributions of propositional attitudes, 
whether to ourselves or to others.  
(b) The mental faculty in question evolved to sustain and facilitate outward looking or 
rather other-directed, forms of cognition. 
Caruthers’ argument is a type of Inference to the Best Explanation. He appeals to 
research in cognitive science to propose a model of how we come to have access to our 
judgments. Roughly speaking, this model of cognition is the following: “the human mind 
exemplifies a perception/belief/desire-making architecture (pp. 79-80). According to this 
model, perceptual outputs are “globally broadcast” to a wide range of concept-using 
systems in the mind.  
This model also explains psychological findings on confabulation. He takes the 
relative acceptance of this model among cognitive scientists to be indicative of its 
validity and its explanatory power for mental events like introspection1. Let us look at 
this model and his interpretation of it more closely.  
                                                 
1
 This model is found to be highly suspect by neuroscientists (Poldrack, personal correspondence) 
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On this account, there are a range of perceptual systems (visual, auditory, 
somatosensory, etc.) which broadcast their outputs to a set of conceptual systems. 
Some of these generate judgments, some create new goals, and some generate 
decisions and intentions for action. Each of these conceptual systems can store its 
outputs in memory, and can access and activate those stored representations when 
reasoning. Included among the systems for generating judgments and beliefs is a 
mindreading faculty, which produces higher-order judgments about the mental 
states of others and of oneself.    
 
 The central feature of this architecture for our purposes is what Caruthers refers to 
as the “mindreading faculty”. This is the faculty, or a type of mechanism, that receives 
input in the form of sensory information (i.e. perceptual, somatosensory, and olfactory). 
According to Baars, (Baars, 2003) some of this sensory information is already “infused” 
with concepts that serve to chunk or categorize it into recognizable bits. The idea is that 
something with a certain sensory light pattern is “matched” to a conceptual “template” 
(e.g. coffee cup). All of these sensory subsystems are operating as “slaves” to the 
working memory or the “workspace” which receives “broadcasts” from the slave 
subsystems. Other faculties “look onto” the workspace and pick information that is 
relevant to their operations. Caruthers considers the “mindreading faculty” to be one of 
such onlookers or “consumers” or workspace “broadcasts”.  
This picture is somewhat analogous to the Facebook architecture. The workspace 
is sort of like your “wall” where other subsystems (your friends or apps) “broadcast” on. 
Your “mindreading” faculty is in turn sort of like your very politically minded self who 
scans your wall for any posts relevant to politics. It disregards all posts that are not 
relevant to politics. It then complies and combines the political posts in a meaningful way 
and comes up with a report on the current political atmosphere of your wall. Your 
“politically minded self” can also scan the walls of your friends and do the same 
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procedure with their walls. All it has to do is look for politically oriented posts, apply 
some sort of interpreting mechanism (e.g. some theory of how posts of this nature come 
together to reflect the overall political atmosphere of a wall) and spit out a 
pronouncement on the political atmosphere of a wall (be it your own wall or the wall of 
your friends). Let us return to an example introduced in the beginning of the paper. Say 
you feel as if you introspected the judgment that you think that the Russian gymnastics 
team is the best in the world. According to Caruthers, this introspective pronouncement 
comes about in the following way. The sensory subsystems have broadcasted the 
following input to the mindreading faculty. You feel exhilarated and excited when the 
Russian gymnasts earn a perfect score on a certain apparatus. You find yourself jumping 
up and down when their score is announced. You feel upset when the judges take 
deductions from their score. You have cleared your entire day’s schedule just to be able 
to watch them compete. You take bathroom breaks only when the gymnasts of other 
countries are performing. The mindreading faculty receives these broadcasts and applies 
the following theory to the data. I never cheer for any team except the Russian team. 
Anyone who cheers for a team must really like the team. I never deny myself snack 
breaks when a sports event is televised, and freely take breaks when any team performs 
except when the Russians perform. Anyone who makes such sacrifices must really like 
the team… . It is easy to see how the rest of the “interpretation” might run.  
 According to Caruthers, the same type of interpretive mindreading process takes 
place when you discern that your friend holds that the Russian gymnastics team is the 
best in the world. You see her cheering for the Russian team, taking breaks only when the 
other teams are performing and never when the Russian team is performing, yelling at the 
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TV when the judges deduce points from the Russian team and cheering on when 
deductions are made to other teams and so on. Your interpretive mechanism takes all this 
evidence into consideration, applies a theory “anyone who acts this way must really like 
the team” and attributes an attitude to your friend “you must really hold that the Russian 
team is the best gymnastics team in the world”.  
You might naturally protest that you feel that you do not engage in any such 
interpretive activity. You might add that when you need to figure out whether you hold 
that the Russian gymnastics team is the best in the world, all you find yourself doing is 
looking inwards and the attitude simply presents itself to you. You might protest “I do not 
need to compile evidence and apply some theory to get onto my own attitude.” It is 
ridiculous to think that you look at you own external behavior and think to yourself “wow 
I am cheering in joy. People generally cheer in joy when they like something. Hence, I 
must really like this team!”  
Caruthers addresses this intuition of immediacy in the following way. According 
to Baars’ model of cognitive architecture, the mindreading mechanism performs its 
interpretations sub-consciously. That is why you are hardly ever actually aware of 
making such interpretations and it seems as if these self attributions just present 
themselves to your consciousness. Consider the Facebook analogy presented above. 
Imagine that the “politically minded self” is actually not you actively searching various 
wall posts, trying to fit the data into some theory of politically minded posts and how 
they come together to produce certain “political atmosphere of the wall” 
pronouncements. Imagine instead that there is actually just an application that you 
subscribe to on your profile. It automatically scans your wall, noting various posts with 
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political content, and automatically uses its program to spit out a given “wall political 
atmosphere” pronouncement. All you have to do is see its pronouncement and not even 
consciously note the various posts that went into it or the manner in which they 
contributed to this particular pronouncement. Furthermore, imagine that this automatic 
application can scan not only your own wall, but also the walls of all of your friends and 
even random Facebook members you happen to encounter. Its programming interprets all 
walls in the same way. All you become aware of is the pronouncement or the attribution. 
Going back to our previous example, you hardly ever find yourself trying to piece 
together the behavior or your friend. You don’t sit there taking notes on all the instances 
when she appears particularly excited about the winnings of the Russian team and only 
smiled a little bit about the winnings of other teams. All you feel is the attribution “she 
thinks that the Russian gymnastics team is the best!” Caruthers points to this phenomena 
to show that your intuitions of “immediacy” when it comes to self attributions actually 
also exist for the attributions you make to others (unless their behavior is somehow 
particularly puzzling, you never catch yourself consciously trying to figure it out or piece 
it together). 
The only difference is that it has access to many more posts on your wall than on 
the walls of others. Naturally, the more information a mechanism has, the more 
accurately it tends to perform. So you see it spiting out pronouncements about the 
political atmosphere of your wall and somehow they turn out to be fairly reliable. On the 
other hand, more mistakes creep up when it targets other walls. Going back to our 
example, when making self attributions about your judgment that the Russian gymnastics 
team is the best, your mindreading faculty has access to your heart rate, the strength that 
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you apply to your jumping up and down and so forth. On the other hand, the mindreading 
mechanism doesn’t have direct access to the heart rate of your friend. You can see her 
jumping up and down but you don’t feel the strength that went into the jump. Notably, 
you also don’t have access to her internal monologue or her inner speech. 
This model provides a neat explanation for the plethora of confabulation 
experiments. Notably, the transparency model can offer no explanation for the prevalence 
of confabulation in normal subjects. Byrne would have to retreat to the view that there 
has been a breach of rationality in all these cases. 
   These experiments are set up to show the existence of an interpretation 
mechanism. Specifically, various cues are presented to the subject’s slave systems. These 
cues are then allegedly broadcast for the interpretation mechanism to consume. These 
cues are cleverly arranged to ultimately “trick” the interpretation mechanism into spitting 
out a seemingly random attitude. Specifically, the mechanism’s output is shown to vary 
with the sensory input only, and not the subject’s consent. The subject himself, on the 
other hand, insists that his beliefs are ultimately the source of the attitude and not a mere 
variation in the sensory input. To make this more specific, let us look over Caruthers’ 
interpretation of one particularly poignant experiment.     
One robust finding in this literature is that people who have been cleverly 
manipulated into writing an essay for a paltry sum of money in defense of 
something that they initially disagree with will end up, after the fact, expressing 
much more sympathy for the position that they have defended than will other 
people who were paid a decent amount (Cohen, 1962; Linder et al., 1967) … .  
Why should writing an essay under conditions of inadequate payment lead to 
heightened belief, when going through the very same process for adequate pay 
doesn’t? (Note that it can’t be the mere fact of thinking up good arguments, and 
so forth, that produces belief, unless for some reason those who are paid less 
should argue better!)(ibid) 
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Caruthers explains the above evidence in the following way. The slave 
subsystems broadcast the following information: this task is requires a lot of effort. I am 
getting no monetary reward for applying all this effort. The interpreting mechanism 
would be receiving these broadcasts and applying some theory in order to put out the 
resultant attitude. For instance, the mechanism might interpret the broadcast in the 
following way. I don’t just apply effort for no reason/reward. My reason must lay in the 
content of this activity. Hence I really support the idea behind this essay! Importantly, if 
the slave systems’ input is altered, so is the resulting attitude. If the slave systems report 
that a great monetary reward has been received for this effort expenditure, the 
interpreting mechanism doesn’t need to try to figure out why the effort is being expanded 
and so doesn’t search for reasons within the content of the activity. Hence the attitude “I 
must really believe in the idea behind this essay” is not produced.  
According to Caruthers, the interpretive mechanism would have produced a 
similar attribution if it were interpreting another person’s behavior. For instance if the 
subject were to see a stranger on the street expanding a great amount of effort writing an 
essay for little pay, he would have figured that the stranger must really support the idea 
presented in the essay. Otherwise, why else would he be doing that? 
 In the next section I will present evidence against ISA. Making self and other 
attributions of propositional attitudes simply can not be supported by the same kind of 
mechanism. 
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Chapter 2.  Objections to ISA theory 
As we have seen above, Caruthers appeals to empirical findings to defend the 
Interpretive Sensory Access theory of introspection. His argument takes the form of an 
inference to the best explanation. In this section I will present empirical findings in 
neuroscience that show that one of the main predictions of the ISA theory is false. 
Specifically it cannot be the case that there is a single mental faculty underlying our 
attributions of propositional attitudes to ourselves and to others. I will show that if the 
“interpretive mechanism” exists, and moreover that it operates in accordance to 
Caruthers’ description in mind reading tasks, (e.g. detecting external cues and paying 
attention to others’ behavior), then this operation would have to be handled or 
implemented at the neural level by the Task Oriented Neural Network. On the other hand, 
it is well known that self-referential thought, including introspective thought is handled 
by the Default Mode Network. This consequence is problematic for the view that self and 
other attitude attributions are done by the same mechanism. The same cognitive operation 
can not be implemented by two distinct neural networks that are in competition with one 
another. 
It is important to note that Caruthers would gladly grant that there is an obvious 
difference between the two tasks (self attributions and other attributions). Self attributions 
involve making use of apperception and inner speech, while other attribution does not. 
Could this difference account for the fact that these two tasks are implemented by 
different neural networks?  
Things are not that simple. Remember that, according to Caruthers, a single mind 
reading capacity is used for both self and other attributions. This single capacity relies on 
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the same sub-personal "interpretive" mechanism that takes sensory information as input 
and produces attitudes as output. To make matters worse, he argues that the only 
difference between the self attributions and the other attributions is quantitative and not 
qualitative in kind. That is, there is simply more sensory evidence available for self 
attributions than for other attributions. Importantly he insists that the type of access to 
one’s attitudes and others’ attitudes is the same.  
Unfortunately, the Default Mode neural network and the Task Oriented network 
implement such different types of thinking that they oppose and interrupt one another’s 
functioning. If the only difference between the two networks was that one simply handles 
a larger quantity of information than the other, they wouldn’t be in competition. It 
appears that there is indeed something special about the very nature of self-referential 
information such that it determines the type of operations involved in its processing. In 
fact, research shows that increased hyperactivity of the DMN network (when the DMN 
network tries to do the job of the Task Oriented network) is correlated with increased 
mental dysfunction, progressing from mood disorders to full on schizophrenia. So cases 
where self and other attribution is really done by the same mechanism (and thus 
implemented by the same neural network) are actually cases of schizophrenia.  
 
Here is a summary of the importance of relevant empirical findings. 
a) “Introspective” or rather “self-referential” information is processed by a distinct neural 
network from all other sensory information. The Default Model Neural network (DMN) 
handles self-referential information, while all other sensory information (including 
sensory information about other people) is handled by the Task Oriented network.     
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b) These two distinct neural networks make possible two distinct types of thinking with 
two distinct types of phenomenology.  
c) The type of thinking made possible by DMN requires different computations to take 
place than the type of thinking made possible by the task-oriented network. 
d) Different computations require different computational mechanisms.   
e) The DMN and the task-oriented network compete with one another. Activity in the 
DMN “interferes” with activity in the task-oriented network by hampering task specific 
attention and contributing to impaired task performance.   
This section will be dedicated to illustrating how “a-e” taken together show the 
ISA prediction (that there is a single mental faculty underlying our attributions of 
propositional attitudes to ourselves and to others) to be false. I will start with defining the 
DMN network, its functional organization, and the cognitive functions it is thought to 
serve. I will then define the task-oriented network and its relation to the DMN network. 
Finally, I will introduce what has become known as the “interference” hypothesis. I will 
elaborate on how fine-tuned and delicate the relation between the DMN and the task-
oriented network really is. After explaining how the delicate relationship between these 
two distinct networks affects normal cognitive functioning, I will introduce an alternative 
evolutionary explanation for having several distinct mindreading mechanisms for self and 
other attributions.  
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2.1 INTRODUCING THE DMN     
In today’s technological age, we might think of ourselves as constantly busy or 
engaging in some goal-directed activity every second of the day. Even while taking a day 
off at the beach we are still tapping away on our iphone returning emails or updating our 
Facebook status. While it is hard to imagine actually being at rest these moments do 
happen. So what does our brain do when not actively engaged in some goal-directed 
activity? The waking “resting state” activity of the brain has been termed the “default 
mode” and is associated with an attenuation of activity in a distinct neural network. 
Specifically Broyd (et al. 2009) writes that attenuation in the ventral medial prefrontal 
cortex (MPFC) occurred with tasks involving judgments that were self-referential, while 
activity in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex increased for self-referential stimuli, 
suggesting the dorsal MPFC is associated with introspective oriented thought (Gusnard et 
al., 2001). Multiple research labs have shown that DMN activity is characterized by very 
low frequency neuronal oscillations (“low frequency BOLD signal). Moreover, 
connectivity (which indicates the functional coherency of a neural network) has been 
show to change with age. For instance there is very limited evidence of DMN activity in 
an infant brain (Fransson et al., 2007). There is evidence of fragmented connectivity 
between the DMN regions during rest in young children (7-8 years; Fair et al., 2008) and 
more consistent DMN connectivity in children aged 9-12 years (Thomason et al., 2008).  
These neural changes map onto our cognitive development. So while infants have no 
trouble visually tracking moving objects and the facial expressions of their caretakers, 
they have trouble tracking their internal mental states.   
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Fransson (2006) writes that activity in the DMN, in the absence of overt task 
performance, engages in any number of spontaneous, self-referential mental events such 
as episodic memory, planning for the future, inner speech, and introspection.  
 
 2.2 INTRODUCING THE TASK-ORIENTED NETWORK 
The “task oriented” network or the task positive network includes the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), inferior parietal cortex (IPC) and supplementary motor area 
(SMA). This network appears to be associated with task-related patterns of increased 
alertness, response preparation and selection (Fox et al., 2005, 2006a; Fransson 2005, 
2006; Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, 2007). Consider the attentional resources that go 
into the goal-directed activity of cutting a peanut butter sandwich. Researches have 
studied vision in the natural world by tracking the subject’s gaze (Hayhoe and Rothkopf, 
2010). Once the subject is about to cut the sandwich in half, gaze will be directed to the 
knife handle to guide the hand to pick it up. As the hand closes in on the knife, the eye 
will move to the corner of the sandwich where the knife tip will be placed to begin 
cutting. When the subject in engaged in this task, the task-oriented network makes sure 
that the brain performs the relevant computations that guide gaze allocation and motor 
movements.   
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 2.3 COMPETITION BETWEEN THE DMN AND THE TASK-ORIENTED NETWORK 
 Working memory tasks (e.g. solving a puzzle or attentively watching a football 
game, making a sandwich) that are not self-referential are associated with an attenuation 
in the DMN regions specified above (Esposito et al., 2006, Salvador et al., 2008).  
Should the DMN network not be sufficiently attenuated during this task and a 
“self-referential” thought surfaces into consciousness (i.e. “I can never manage to make 
pretty looking sandwich halves” or “am I taking too long with these sandwiches?”), task 
performance will worsen considerably (i.e. you might end up accidentally cutting your 
finger instead of the bread).Whenever activity in the task-positive networks of the brain 
increases (when attention is directed externally), DMN activity has been shown to 
decrease. Furthermore, spontaneous spikes in the DMN activity (in four left hemisphere 
regions implicated in self-referential thought) are associated with task unrelated thoughts. 
These “interferences” are in turn associated with poor task performance (McKiernan et 
al., 2003, 2006; Corbetta & Shulman, 2006; Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005).  
The relationship between the DMN and the task-oriented network is quite fine 
tuned, and any deviation or imbalance greatly affects normal cognitive functioning of the 
individual. Broyd cites Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos in stating the following.  
The high degree of temporal anti-correlation emphasizes the potential degree of 
antagonism between the DMN and the task positive network and the 
psychological functions they reflect. 
 
The lack of suppression of DMN activity during a goal-oriented task has been associated 
with various mental disorders. Before we move on to elaborate on the relationship 
between the two networks another preliminary is in order. It is generally agreed that 
DMN activity is associated with self- referential thought including mind wandering and 
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introspection. However, some have proposed that it might also be involved in attributing 
mental states to others. If DMN were really responsible for both self and other attribution 
of propositional attitudes, it would appear that there really is no trouble for self/other 
parity accounts. However, the mental techniques that trigger DMN activity are not those 
of observing and interpreting others’ behavior. It is only when emotionally salient stimuli 
are involved in simulating others’ mental states that DMN shows activation (Maddock, 
1999). This sort of self-referential or emotionally salient processing is in fact attenuated 
when attention is directed toward external events (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001).  
 
2.4 DMN DYSFUNCTION IN MENTAL DISORDERS     
 As illustrated in the previous section, activity in the DMN “interferes” with 
activity in the task-oriented network. Broyd summarizes the point in the following way: 
“The ability to maintain attentional focus and resist distraction or lapses of attention is 
considered to underlie higher order top-down control” (ibid). She continues to summarize 
recent neuroscience findings in the following way: “intrusions of introspective thought 
produce variability in task performance in normal population” (ibid). Groups that suffer 
the most from most DMN interference are the Schizophrenic patients (Zhou et al., 2007). 
In general any type of dysfunction of introspective processes is associated with DMN 
interference. Namely, depressive patients who self-report an abnormally large amount of 
self-referential thought processing show lack of attenuation of DMN during goal-directed 
activity. As shown above, this lack of attenuation causes poor task performance. 
Processing all incoming information in a self-referential manner (e.g. they are all looking 
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at me, I look silly to them, why do bad things always happen to me) puts a great strain on 
attentional resources and results in characteristic “absent-minded” behavior exhibited by 
depressed subjects (Greicious et al., 2007). 
As we can see if self and other attributions of propositional attitudes were all 
handled by the same neural network and consequently the same cognitive mechanism, the 
world would be filled with “absent-minded” individuals.   
 
2.5 EVOLUTIONARY ADVANTAGES FOR HAVING DISTINCT MECHANISMS FOR SELF 
AND OTHER ATTRIBUTIONS. 
Caruthers argues that having the same mechanism do the work of self and other 
attributions is advantageous from an evolutionary perspective. Here is what he writes. 
There exists a good answer to the question why an ‘‘outwardly focused’’ 
mindreading faculty of the sort represented in Figure 1 (or the capacity to 
construct such a faculty via learning) might have evolved. This is some or other 
version of the ‘‘Machiavellian intelligence’’ hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten, 1988, 
1998), which points to the immense fitness advantages that can accrue to effective 
mindreaders among highly social creatures such as ourselves. We also have good 
evidence that the brain is constructed in such a way as to realize the global 
broadcast of perceptual events, thus facilitating other-directed mindreading inter 
alia, together with introspection of such events as a by-product. 
 
In light of the discussion in the previous sections, I will try to lay out some evolutionary 
advantages for having distinct mechanisms for handling self and other attributions of 
propositional attitudes. It appears that not only self and other attributions are not handled 
by the same mechanism, but that not all other attributions are handled by the same 
mechanism either. Caruthers’ appeal to simplicity in theorizing about a “one for all” 
mechanism is definitely wrong minded.   
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Researchers have found that the amount of “self-involvement” (effectively the 
amount of DMN activated) during a mindreading task depends on our familiarity with the 
person. For instance, when getting on to the propositional attitude of your best friend you 
tend to use "Simulation"2 like techniques which require the use of self-referential oriented 
DMN network; whereas when getting onto the propositional attitudes of a stranger you 
tend to use "Theory Theory"3 like techniques which tax the "task-oriented" neural 
network. (Krienen et al., 2010). Attributing mental states to individuals perceived to be 
significant by the attributer relies on systems optimized to process self-referential 
information. What might be the evolutionary advantage for having specialized 
mindreading systems instead of a single one? 
Immense advantages arise from discerning self-referential information from non-
self referential information. It is valuable to know whether to expend valuable energy 
helping others who are relevant to your survival. For example, monkeys sacrifice 
themselves by giving off a warning call for other monkeys in their group. By giving off 
this signal they essential put a big red target on their backs since their cry allows the 
predator to locate them without fail. This self sacrifice is ultimately advantageous for the 
individual since most other members of the tribe share a great deal of the genome. 
Similar sacrifices are often times performed for offspring and so on. Given humans’ 
richer conceptual repertoire, the classification of “similar” others extends beyond 
genotype similarity. For instance people who have never met Stalin still sobbed at the 
news of his illness since they viewed him as a close other. DMN activation during these 
                                                 
2
 This view holds that we represent the mental states and processes of others by mentally simulating them, 
or generating similar states and processes in ourselves 
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types of mindreading tasks allows subjects to emotionally identify with others and view 
others’ mental states and relevant to their own.  
However, it would not be advantageous to identify or attempt to simulate the 
mental states of all others. Recall the discussion from the previous sections. If the DMN 
were activated in all mindreading tasks, the subject’s attentional mechanism would 
greatly suffer. He would no longer be able to perform simple everyday tasks like making 
a peanut butter sandwich. Moreover, consider the following examples of mindreading.  
People who performed atrocities during WW2 had no trouble successfully 
attributing mental states to their victims for they were able to successfully manipulate and 
control them. They were able to do so because they felt themselves to be completely 
“separate” or “dissimilar” to their victims. It is likely that their task-oriented network was 
active in discerning the mental states of their victims. They were able to methodically 
observe their victims’ behavior and theorize about their attitudes. Once the attitudes of 
others are well known, they become easier to manipulate.  
Given the distinct types of thinking made possible by the DMN and the task 
oriented network respectively, humans are able to attribute mental states to close others 
and achieve some degree of shared subjectivity while at the same time accurately 
attribute mental states and manipulate strangers. It is vital for survival that these two 
techniques of mindreading remain absolutely separate and do not get mixed up. That is 
why these two techniques are not both achieved via one and the same mechanism. The 
swiftness of implementing either technique is so vital (e.g. the self sacrificial act must be 
                                                                                                                                                 
3
 The view that a tacit theory (a “folk” psychology) underlies psychological competence 
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done in a fraction of a second) that a completely distinct neural network is needed for 
each.  
Consider the following remarkable episode documented by a group of researchers 
studying lions in their natural habitat. A lioness somehow came to “befriend” a gazelle 
(Animal Planet, 2008). She would defend the gazelle and treat it as a close other e.g. she 
would groom it and so on. Unfortunately, at the same time the lioness lost the ability to 
stalk and prey on gazelles. She lost the ability to kill and eventually almost died of 
starvation. This episode shows the unfortunate reality of the natural habitat in which 
humans evolved. In this environment, the ability to successfully mindread others and 
predict their actions and attitudes without “identifying” with them is vital for survival. 
Even within the same species, acts of aggression and calculated manipulation (e.g. during 
mating) were necessary for the majority of our evolutionary history. In order for each 
type of attribution to be performed efficiently (whether it be to the self, a close other, or a 




The aim of this paper was to show one of the main predictions of the ISA theory 
to be false. This prediction is the following. There is a single mental faculty underlying 
our attributions of propositional attitudes, whether to ourselves or to others. I have laid 
out research in neuroscience that suggests that the above prediction cannot be 
accommodated. What I did not do is provide a vindication of authoritative and special 
access. I think that Caruthers has rightly pointed out that the transparency model is 
lacking in accounting for the prevalence of confabulation in normal subjects. Moreover, 
he is right to demand an empirical basis for the so called non-extravagant mechanism for 
acquiring self-knowledge. I think that there is indeed something special or rather unique 
about the processing mechanism responsible for handling self-relevant information. The 
very cognitive process by which this information is handled is distinct from that 
responsible for tracking external features in the environment. These findings however do 
not show whether the uniqueness of this mechanism is good or bad for the security status 
of self-knowledge. All they show is that Caruthers’ broadcasting model is on the wrong 
track. 
I have also presented an alternative evolutionary explanation that outlines the 
adaptive advantage for having at least two attributive mechanisms. Caruthers may have 
been overly motivated by research in Artificial Intelligence and may have forgotten to 
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